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“How Shall We Put 
Ourselves in Touch 
with Reality?” On 
Baldwin, Film, and 
Acknowledgment
what might film’s contribution be to the work of acknowledgment, 
apology, and moral repair? Can a film itself constitute a form of acknowl-
edgment? Memorials and monuments are the more obvious candidates 
of art forms to study in this context, but film—perhaps the most popu-
lar form of public art, or perhaps it once was (Mitchell 1990, 889)—is 
one of our essential media for collectively reflecting on what we have 
done and for collectively picturing who we are. While a memorial is 
typically marked off from ordinary life—“a special precinct extruded 
from life, a segregated enslave” (Danto 1985, 152)—film is more contin-
uous with our ordinary lives, and thus might be more indicative of 
what we are prone to avoid or willing to acknowledge.
In his 1976 book on film, The Devil Finds Work, James Baldwin 
reflects on the role that film might play in the extensive, multidimen-
sional, public task of, as he puts it, “putting ourselves in touch with 
reality.” “Reality” here refers to the reality of American racism, its his-
tory and present, and Baldwin is primarily concerned with whether 
American films can put us in touch with that reality or whether they 
will remain instead at an “absolutely appalling distance” from it (58). 
While Baldwin focuses on films that fall into the latter category, es-
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pecially films that distort and avoid the reality of American racism 
while purporting to face and denounce it, his text also evidences a 
conviction that film could be a medium for more adequate acknowl-
edgment. So the questions are: How is it that films can avoid the re-
ality of American racism even when they take it up as their explicit 
theme and content? And what would it look like for film to adequate-
ly acknowledge that reality?
Films project pictures of what racism is, not by painting or ver-
bal description or abstract rendering, but by picturing—photograph-
ing—us, that is, real racialized human beings. Through its narrative 
and aesthetic strategies, a film constructs a specific picture or con-
ception of the reality of racism: what racism is, how it is expressed 
and maintained, how it is suffered and fought. As we will see, some 
of these pictures function to facilitate further avoidance of reality, 
while other cinematic pictures constitute and enable acknowledg-
ment. “The camera sees what you want it to see. The language of the 
camera is the language of our dreams” (Baldwin 1976, 35).
In this paper I discuss two kinds of cinematic pictures or con-
ceptions of racism: (1) films that present racism as a special event, typi-
cally an action, that erupts within some broader world, and (2) films 
that present racism as a pervasive, structural reality, as part of the 
world itself. I look at two films made three years apart: I develop 
Baldwin’s analysis of Norman Jewison’s 1967 In the Heat of the Night 
as an example of the former, and offer my own analysis of Michael 
Roemer’s 1964 Nothing But a Man as an instance of the latter. Nothing 
But a Man is to this day not well known, though it is almost univer-
sally praised by the critics and academics who do know it, and the 
film was threatened at every stage of its development. The material 
history and life of Nothing But a Man—the trials of its production and 
release, its neglect and belated restoration—are expressive and part 
of the history and life of America. By contrast, In the Heat of the Night 
was widely supported and celebrated. This paper should help explain 
these revealingly divergent responses.
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Regarding what is required for the collective acknowledgment 
of American racism, Thomas McCarthy writes:
Public remembrances and commemorations of the suffer-
ing of victims—through artistic as well as historical rep-
resentations, in public rituals and public places, in school 
curricula and mass media—play crucial roles in transform-
ing traditions and in determining what will or will not be 
passed on to future generations … Recognizing past evil 
as integral to [our] history, as issuing “from the very midst 
of our collective life”—rather than as marginal or accidental 
to us—“cannot but have a powerful impact on our self- 
understanding” (2002, 627. quoting Habermas 2001, 45, 
my emphases).
My argument here is that films that picture American racism as inte-
gral to, even constitutive of, American reality are a crucial means for 
acknowledging racism—past or present—as issuing from the midst 
of collective life. I am not suggesting that (white) audiences will be 
morally improved by watching such movies. The films guarantee 
nothing. And yet their absence or obscurity suggests that our efforts 
to acknowledge such a reality are and will be inadequate. In a film-
going society, their absence indicates that the public does not yet have 
an adequate shared conception of what racism actually is. In her essay 
on Nothing But a Man, Terri Francis affirms simply: “history needs a 
cinematic imagination” (2015, 111). This paper argues that cinematic 
imagination can be an important form of acknowledgment.
in his 1962 essay “as much truth as one can bear,” baldwin poses the 
question: “How shall we put ourselves in touch with reality?” (37). 
The reality with which he is specifically concerned is the reality of 
American racism, its history and its present (where these are not sepa-
rable, since “history is literally present in all that we do” [1965, 723]). 
Baldwin presents this as an outstanding task because Americans—
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especially, though not exclusively, white Americans—are staggeringly 
out of touch with this reality. As we shall see, Baldwin observes a 
robust national appetite for attending to racism when it is pictured as 
an explosive, gaudy historical spectacle, but little interest in or stom-
ach for trying to acknowledge racism as “one of the principal facts of 
[America’s] life” (1961, 116), that is, as a constitutive, structural real-
ity. So when Baldwin voices the need to put ourselves in touch with 
reality, he means American racism as integral to America’s reality and 
its sense of itself. I will not here present an argument that racism 
is integral to and partially constitutive of America’s social, political, 
and economic life, of its historical and present self-understanding. I 
proceed on the assumption that this is Baldwin’s conception, that it is 
correct, and that it still calls for adequate acknowledgment.1
Throughout his writing, Baldwin insists on the outstanding 
need to acknowledge and assume the burden of this entrenched real-
ity, and on the equally entrenched practice of white avoidance. As he 
writes, “the fact that they [white people] have not yet been able to do 
this—to face their history, to change their lives—hideously menaces 
this country. Indeed it menaces the entire world” (1965, 722). The task 
of acknowledging this reality may indeed be the idea that most ori-
ents Baldwin’s work as a whole: he invokes it throughout his corpus, 
it is the aim he sets himself in his fiction, and it is the final standard 
to which he holds works of art in his criticism. While he sees mass 
culture as functioning primarily to facilitate avoidance (“mass culture 
really reflects … the American bewilderment in the face of the world 
we live in. We do not seem to want to know what we are in the world” 
[1960, 375]), Baldwin never abandons his conviction maintains that 
art has the power and responsibility to disrupt such ignorance and 
self-ignorance, to “reveal something a little closer to the truth” (1955, 
12). As he writes in “As Much Truth,” “the multiple truths about a 
people are revealed by that people’s artists—that is what artists are 
for” (1962, 37). Before turning to Baldwin’s writings on art and film, it 
will be helpful to first briefly elucidate this idea of acknowledgment.
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In philosophical discussion on moral repair and responding to 
wrongdoing, the acknowledgment of wrongdoing is seen as essen-
tial to atonement, apology, and repair of any form, whether private 
or public, individual or collective. Linda Radzick, for instance, writes 
that acknowledging culpable wrongdoing is the “least controversial” 
requirement of atonement and apology (2004, 150). Some even treat 
these concepts as synonymous (see Govier 1999, 5), as when Corntas-
sel and Holder reference Canada’s and Australia’s “official apologies/
acknowledgments” (2008, 486). Without adequate acknowledgment, 
there can be no adequate apology. As Margaret Urban Walker writes:
an apology that arrives too soon, one that precedes full 
examination of the nature and magnitude of wrongdoing 
and appears to head off a full expression of the grief and 
anger of the victims, becomes an insult. It may signify a 
self-serving interest of those burdened with responsibility 
who want to cut their costs and protect their sense of de-
cency from being challenged. (2006, 203)
Walker suggests that the posture of apology can actually be more 
comfortable—self-serving, self-protective—than the work of acknowl-
edgment. Especially in cases of complex, historical, and entrenched 
injustice, repudiating and apologizing for the wrong may be an effort 
to skip over the acknowledgment in a rush to assume a position of 
distance and moral clarity. What is it that makes acknowledgment so 
challenging?
The concept of acknowledgment is as intuitively significant as 
it is difficult to articulate. In her paper “What Is Acknowledgment 
and Why Is It Important?” Trudy Govier (1999) describes a somewhat 
paradoxical situation: in political and academic contexts where col-
lectives work either to address serious wrongdoing or to analyze the 
components of an adequate response, the concept of acknowledg-
ment was regularly invoked as essential, and yet the subjects involved 
in these discussions just as often could not say what it meant. I pro-
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pose that the concept of acknowledgment has four essential compo-
nents: it is reflexive, it is practical, it is answerable to some reality, 
and its avoidance is not merely a contingent failure or lack but a pos-
ture towards which we are actively prone (and as we shall see, some 
more than others).
Philosophers typically limn the concept of acknowledgment 
by distinguishing it from theoretical knowledge, with the latter con-
strued narrowly as an epistemic achievement, the acquisition of justi-
fied true beliefs. It is possible to know something without acknowl-
edging it: I may know, theoretically, that you are in pain, or that I 
broke a promise, or that I am a woman, or that racism is integral to 
our history and present, but something further is required if I am 
to acknowledge any of this. Acknowledgment implicates me in that 
which I acknowledge and calls for some response; acknowledgment 
is thus reflexive and practical (Cavell 2002a, 257; Govier 1999, 7). To 
acknowledge your pain, for instance, I do not simply cognize it as 
a fact in the world but also recognize your pain as something that 
makes a claim on me, calls on me to do or reveal something (Cavell 
2002a, 257). Likewise, acknowledging something about myself, for ex-
ample, that I am in pain or that I am a woman, involves appreciating 
the object of acknowledgment—my pain or my gender—not just as a 
fact but also as implicating me and as part of my practical milieu, as 
something that makes a difference to how I understand myself and 
how I go on. It is likewise for the history and present of society. If I’ve 
read some history and statistics, I may know that racism is one of the 
principal facts of American life, but this is not yet to acknowledge it; 
the latter would implicate me in those realities and them in me, call 
for some response, and revise my understanding of self and world. 
Thus, acknowledgment may not be the act of a moment but the work 
of a lifetime.
These examples also show that there is an essentially receptive 
dimension to acknowledgment: acknowledgment is answerable to 
some extant reality (Govier 1999, 16) and is in this respect analogous 
to acceptance (Cavell 2002b, 324). It is important to call attention to 
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this, since in philosophy’s rush to distinguish acknowledgment from 
theoretical knowledge, its receptive dimension can be underempha-
sized. Yet while acknowledgment apprehends, accepts, and responds 
to something given, this does not mean accepting something as a 
fixed fact to be left as is. The point is rather that acceptance of reality 
is a condition for responding to it. Here, for example, is how Baldwin 
characterizes his relationship to America’s history:
It is to history that we owe our frames of references, our 
identities, and our aspirations. And it is with great pain 
and terror that one begins to realize this. In great pain and 
terror one begins to assess the history which has placed 
one where one is, and formed one’s point of view…. I am 
speaking as a historical creation which has had bitterly to 
contest its history, to wrestle with it, and finally accept it, 
in order to bring myself out of it. (1965, 723)
What Baldwin describes here is the difference between cognizing 
history as a set of facts, and acknowledging history as implicating 
who he is and as calling for some response. Acknowledging history 
involves seeing oneself as implicated in and shaped by that history, 
where this is a condition for any effort to “bring [oneself ] out of it.”
Precisely because acknowledgment is reflexive, practical, re-
ceptive, and thus demanding, “some of what we know or are in a 
position to know, we do not acknowledge and would not be willing to 
acknowledge” (Govier 1999, 7). Insofar as acknowledgment changes 
one’s practical circumstances, responsibilities, and understanding of 
self and world, it will be frequently avoided. For Cavell, the concept of 
avoidance is essential to the concept of acknowledgment. It is because 
we avoid and deny others that acknowledgment becomes necessary 
(1971, 123), and thus, as he puts it, “the concept of acknowledgment 
is evidenced equally by its failure as by its success” (2002a, 263). The 
reason the failure of acknowledgment is not simply a contingent case 
of falling short is that the avoidance of acknowledgment is active, 
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something one does, hence something for which one is responsible: 
“A ‘failure to know’ might just mean a piece of ignorance, an absence 
of something, a blank. A ‘failure to acknowledge’ is the presence of 
something, a confusion, an indifference, a callousness, an exhaus-
tion, a coldness” (2002a, 264).
Now, Cavell tends to consider acknowledgment and avoidance 
as broadly human capacities and propensities, and does not typically 
analyze these concepts through structural or historical lenses. Bald-
win’s contribution is thus to present the tendency to avoid reality, 
and hence the outstanding need for acknowledgment, in socio-histor-
ical and racialized terms. Specifically, he understands the tendency to 
avoid reality as one especially pursued by white people. For Baldwin, 
being white is not a natural kind (“there are no white people” [1984, 
169]) but a social, institutional, and historical reality and achieve-
ment (see 1963, 346). It is not that there are, naturally, white people 
with a natural predisposition towards avoidance and self-deception. 
Rather, what we could call the social practice of being white, within a 
white supremacist society, is a practice that involves the avoidance of 
reality (see also Mills 1999). Baldwin sometimes describes the avoid-
ance of reality as an avoidance of factual knowledge (“one wishes that 
Americans, white Americans, would read, for their own sakes, this 
[historical] record, and stop defending themselves against it” [1965, 
722]), but he is more typically concerned with the avoidance of the 
reflexive, practical, and transformative dimensions of acknowledg-
ment: “the danger in the minds of most white Americans is the loss 
of their identity. Any upheaval in the universe is terrifying because 
it so profoundly attacks one’s sense of one’s own reality” (1963, 294). 
Avoidance is the strategy for maintaining this sense of self and world. 
And again, for Baldwin, what is avoided, hence what stands most in 
need of acknowledgment, is the reality of American racism as inte-
gral to American reality.
I have so far elaborated these concepts primarily through the 
lens of the individual, so how should we understand public and col-
lective acknowledgment and avoidance? The production and main-
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tenance of collective acknowledgment of the history and present of 
American racism involve material investment in public and collective 
cultural, political, and economic mechanisms. These can be explicit 
and directed, as in the case of criminal trials, truth commissions, 
reparations, memorials, and official apologies, and they can also be 
more integrated and continuous with ordinary life, as part of what 
Thomas McCarthy calls the politics of public memory and the politics 
of education. He writes:
Until legal, institutional, normal everyday racism is pub-
licly and widely understood to have been integral to our 
history and identity as a nation, we will … continue to en-
counter major obstacles for developing the degree of tran-
sracial political solidarity required for demographic solu-
tions to the forms of racial injustice that are its continuing 
legacy. (2002, 641)
What Baldwin emphasizes is that collective avoidance involves no less 
material investment and is no less active, even if—because it is so 
entrenched and routine—it will typically not be so self-aware. It is, as 
he puts it, a “sacredly cultivated” ignorance (1971). Walker describes 
it as “a history of concerted and institutionally supported denial. The 
maintenance of this history is itself a collective work in which some 
construct and shore up falsehoods while others are incurious, compla-
cent, or actively resist opportunities to know the truth” (2006, 205).
Baldwin finds evidence of this practiced avoidance in his every-
day interactions and lived experience, and in the political arena, and 
also as it is enacted in literature, and—turning to my focus here—in 
film, as discussed in his 1976 book The Devil Finds Work.
in the devil finds work, baldwin presents cinema not just as a popular 
art form but also as a shared, public site of collective instruction, part 
of our politics of education. Specifically, he describes film as a crucial 
site of national, racial instruction: America’s dominant racialized 
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self-understanding is articulated—pictured—on film. The book opens 
with memories from childhood, where Baldwin describes his earliest 
encounters with the world—or, with America—as mediated through 
film, and his first experiences at the movies as some of his earliest 
formative encounters with America’s racial reality.
Baldwin focuses on popular films that expressly focus on race 
and racism, including In the Heat of the Night (1967), Guess Who’s Com-
ing to Dinner (1967), and Lady Sings the Blues (1972). His analyses carry 
forward his earlier critique of the protest novel, a genre guided by the 
intention to demonstrate that slavery or racism (or some other insti-
tution) is wrong. What appalls Baldwin ethically and aesthetically is 
that these works simplify at once the reality of American racism and 
the work of acknowledgment, providing the reader with a premature, 
self-congratulatory sense of moral accomplishment. These works pro-
vide a kind of performance of acknowledgment that functions to 
avoid the task, offering the more comfortable position of moral repu-
diation in its place (see also Frank 2014).
The “protest” novel, so far from being disturbing, is an ac-
cepted and comforting aspect of the American scene … 
Whatever unsettling questions are raised are evanescent, 
titillating; remote, for this has nothing to do with us, it is 
safely ensconced in the social arena, where indeed, it has 
nothing to do with anyone, so that finally we receive a very 
definite thrill of virtue from the fact that we are reading 
such a book at all. (1955, 15)
Thus when Baldwin writes, as we saw, that “the multiple truths 
about a people are revealed by that people’s artists—that is what art-
ists are for,” this must be understood in two ways. He is first of all 
proposing that it is the task of the artist to subject their society to 
critical examination. But Baldwin is also demanding that we read art-
ists symptomatically, as revealing the truths of their society the way 
a symptom reveals an illness or a dream reveals a wish. A film can 
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picture and project an American wish, even in spite of its (its cre-
ator’s) intentions (again: “the language of the camera is the language 
of our dreams” [1976, 35]). A film that expressly purports to face and 
condemn American racism can indeed reveal some significant truth 
about that reality, not because it is adequate to the task of acknowl-
edgment but through its tactics for avoiding it.
I now turn to the central task of this paper, which is to elaborate two 
broad cinematic strategies: films can picture racism as a special event 
and films can picture racism as a pervasive reality (these two strategies 
are not exhaustive, and a single film can engage both). I analyze In 
the Heat of the Night as an instance of the former and Nothing But a Man 
as an instance of the latter. Following Baldwin, I will argue that the 
former constitutes an avoidance of reality, while the latter constitutes 
a kind of acknowledgment.
In the Heat of the Night was released in 1967; it won five Academy 
Awards, and spawned two sequels and a television show. The film 
stars Sidney Poitier—an actor Baldwin returns to again and again—as 
Philadelphia police detective Virgil Tibbs, who is arrested in a Missis-
sippi train station for murder. After realizing (with incredulity) who 
Tibbs is and that he is innocent, local police chief and flagrant racist 
Gillespie (Rod Steiger) reluctantly capitulates to the idea that Tibbs 
should stay to help with the investigation. The film’s murder plot 
provides the occasion for the film’s real story, which is Tibbs and Gil-
lespie’s relationship and “the salvation of the Sheriff’s soul” (1976, 
53). Baldwin regards the film as inept and narratively and psychologi-
cally preposterous, but he is careful to note that one cannot simply 
dismiss it: “our situation would be far more coherent if it were pos-
sible to categorize, or dismiss, In the Heat of the Night so painlessly” 
(1976, 58). Bad films about racism still reveal multiple truths about a 
people; its failures will be instructive.
My proposal is that In the Heat of the Night pictures American 
racism as a special event: contained, spectacular, inexplicable, and 
finally surmountable. This picture can be developed from Baldwin’s 
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discussion of the framing of the film, the perfunctory near-lynching 
scene, and the final exchange between Tibbs and Gillespie.
Tibbs is introduced on his way out: he is first seen at a train sta-
tion waiting to travel back to Philadelphia. He is detained in the Mis-
sissippi town for the course of the film, but in the end is finally able 
to take his leave, a departure that was essentially predestined. This 
framework immediately pictures the racism that is the film’s subject 
as spatially and geographically quarantined. Tibbs’s northward trajec-
tory invokes a wider world, one that remains remote from the hor-
rors of the South and always available as an exit:
Mr. Virgil Tibbs comes from freedom-loving Philadelphia 
… to this haven, he will return, if he lives. But we know 
that he will live. The star of a film is rarely put to death, 
and certainly not this star, and certainly not in this film. 
(1976, 53)
Baldwin thus links the absence of genuine narrative tension with the 
film’s spatial containment of racism: by guaranteeing Tibbs’s/Poitier’s 
safe return to the North from the start, the film encloses racism in 
the South. And because, narratively, the racist threat to Tibbs is never 
real (we know he will live), the film thereby presents American racism 
as equally unreal, as already transcended, as proved by the fact of 
“Philadelphia.”
For Baldwin, the film lacks not only narrative tension but also 
coherence; he describes the film as a series of disjointed scenes hung 
together on a convoluted plot. The plot functions primarily as an op-
portunity for “titillating” depictions of racism and racial violence, 
which are either morally invigorating (when a racist is somehow re-
buffed) or morally appalling (when Tibbs is momentarily threatened 
or insulted). In the penultimate scene—“the exciting scene,” as Bald-
win puts it (1976, 57, emphasis mine)—a mob of feverish white peo-
ple surrounds Tibbs, acting out an iconic and therefore (for white au-
diences) satisfying picture of what racism is, of how it looks: crazed, 
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hideous, spectacular, and finally something so explosive that it must, 
of necessity, come to an end. Its horror is as exhilarating as it is fa-
miliar, designed to elicit the satisfying response of “pious horror and 
gratified reassurance” yet “without in the least involving or intimi-
dating the spectator” (1976, 114). The spectators remain uninvolved 
because the spectacle is immediately legible and essentially for them. 
Its total transparency and lack of interiority or mystery mean that it 
requires no imagination or reflection, no work on the audience’s part 
(though of course Baldwin’s analysis demonstrates that its very trans-
parency calls for the work of criticism). Thus, the more spectacular 
the racial violence, the more effectively it is isolated from the rest of 
reality (including the spectator); and the more isolated it is, the less 
genuinely real.
In the final scene, Gillespie walks Tibbs to the train station, the 
white man carrying the Black man’s bag. As Tibbs boards the train, 
Gillespie turns around and calls his name. Gillespie looks at Tibbs 
with pleading eyes, and then says, “You take care, you hear?” Tibbs 
looks back for a few beats, and breaks out with a gracious smile and 
says “yeah,” to which Gillespie smiles back, even bigger. Baldwin, 
ingeniously, describes this as the film’s “obligatory fade-out kiss,” 
which “in the classic American film, did not really speak of love, and, 
still less, of sex: it spoke of reconciliation, of all things now becoming 
possible” (1976, 58). The film thus ends with an unspoken but definite 
reconciliation, without blame, apology, or forgiveness but instead a 
shared and smiling understanding that such work is already done.
In these specific ways, In the Heat of the Night pictures Ameri-
can racism as a spatially, temporally, visually, and morally contained 
special event. Paradoxically, its very specialness and spectacularism 
render the event wholly familiar and unthreatening. This strategy 
functions to quarantine and contain American racism, presenting it 
as an exceptional event within some wider world, but crucially, it 
is emphatically not genuinely part of the world itself. Through these 
strategies, the film avoids (and facilitates the audience’s avoidance of ) 
the reality of American racism as American reality. And crucially—
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and, I hope, obviously—this strategy is not unique to this film but is 
rather a staple of American filmmaking.2
In the same year as this film’s release, Martin Luther King Jr. 
writes: “it is necessary to refute the idea that the dominant ideology 
in our country even today is freedom and equality while racism is just 
an occasional departure from the norm on the part of a few bigoted 
extremists” (1967, 73, 88). What must be rejected, according to King, 
is a conception of racism as exceptional, hence not in any meaningful 
sense part of America’s ordinary, functional reality. According to the 
dominant ideology, freedom and equality are the norm in both the 
normative ideal and the empirical sense: racism is regarded as both a 
deviation from America’s governing ideals and statistically rare. Mc-
Carthy refers to this as America’s “master narrative” (2002, 766), and 
“versions of it have been disseminated in every generation and to ev-
ery new wave of immigrants—through schooling, citizenship require-
ments, public celebrations, museums and memorials, the mass media 
and just about every other vehicle of popular culture” (766).
As should be clear, films that picture racism as a special event 
consolidate this ideology. While such films purport to face and con-
demn racism, they facilitate avoidance by presenting racism as an un-
usual departure from a wider reality that remains morally intact. This 
is the wish that such films reveal. Recall that “the danger in the minds 
of most white Americans is the loss of their identity. Any upheaval 
in the universe is terrifying because it so profoundly attacks one’s 
sense of one’s own reality” (Baldwin 1963, 294). Because acknowledg-
ment of the reality of racism would involve just such an upheaval, 
the temptation will be to skip the work of acknowledgment and as-
sume the position of moral censure and denunciation, which insists 
on distance and moral difference from that reality. An easily legible, 
isolated moral horror can be easily condemned. Films that picture 
racism as a special event make precisely this move. As Baldwin writes 
in “Mass Culture and the Creative Artist,” “these movies are designed 
not to trouble, but to reassure; they do not reflect reality, they merely 
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rearrange its elements into something we can bear. They weaken our 
ability to deal with the world as it is, ourselves as we are” (1960, 375).
But now the question is: What would it look like for a film to 
acknowledge racism as reality? Can film picture racism not as a spe-
cial event but as a pervasive, structural, material reality, as integrated 
into the broader world? And can a film picture the pervasive reality of 
racism without suggesting its permanence or inevitability? Can film 
picture racism as a reality that could be resisted? There is no one way 
that a film must do this; whether any film constitutes a form of ac-
knowledgment would need to be argued through close analysis of its 
narrative and form. I’ll now argue that Nothing But a Man should be un-
derstood as an exemplar of film-as-acknowledgment. I focus on how 
the film renders the social and material world, as well as its emphasis 
on the characters’ interiority and resistance to that world.
nothing but a man is a 1964 independent feature film directed by 
Michael Roemer, who coauthored the screenplay with Robert Young.3 
Roemer and Young previously worked on documentaries on civil 
rights activism, on the Angolan uprising of 1961, and on the slums of 
Palermo (the latter was commissioned by NBC but never broadcast, 
deemed too powerful for the American public). Both Roemer and 
Young connected their interest in making Nothing But a Man with their 
own experiences of anti-Semitism4 (Roemer fled Berlin in 1939 when 
he was 11). To write the script, they traveled the Southern states for 
eight weeks, meeting with and interviewing activists working with 
the Congress of Racial Equity, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. 
While the film is set in an unnamed town near Birmingham, Alabama, 
most scenes were shot in New Jersey, as shooting with an all-Black 
cast in the South was deemed too dangerous. The film had trouble 
finding funding for both production and distribution, and once it did, 
none of the large movie theaters wanted to show it. It was one of 
Malcolm X’s favorite films. In 1993, Nothing But a Man was named to 
the National Film Registry at the Library of Congress, which selects 
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films for preservation for being “culturally, historically, or aestheti-
cally significant.” (In the Heat of the Night was named in 2002.) Nothing 
But a Man was thus threatened at every stage of its development and 
only belatedly recognized. This is not as a lapse or accident but part of 
America’s history of concerted and institutionally supported practices 
of avoidance and denial. Thus the life of this film is caught up with 
the world that it shows, with our real world folded into the film’s own 
history.
Nothing But a Man opens first with the sounds and then with 
documentary-style, black-and-white images of a jackhammer blasting 
on a train track. The shot is low to the ground between someone’s 
feet, with the lines of the track continuing into the horizon, where a 
group of men work further along. The next shot is a close-up of the 
protagonist, Duff (Ivan Dixon), followed by more and varied shots of 
Black men working on the track, surrounded by trees. These Black 
figures are literally at work constructing America itself. The film’s 
first shots are thus emphatically material, with the camera riveted to 
bodies, machines, and earth, all contributing to a sense of both the 
film and its characters as rooted in this world.
Nothing But a Man—shot with a neorealist aesthetic and Mo-
town music—follows Duff, a railroad section hand, who meets Josie 
(singer Abbey Lincoln, in her first starring role), an avowedly com-
mitted schoolteacher and the reverend’s daughter, while his crew is 
stopped for a few weeks working outside her small town. The first 
half of the film follows their courtship, along with Duff’s uneasy rela-
tionship with both Josie’s father and his own (in Birmingham). Josie’s 
father (Stanley Green), working in accommodationist collaboration 
with the white people in town, disapproves of Duff, first because of 
his job and then because of his anti-accommodationist commitments. 
Duff’s father, Will (Julius Harris), handicapped by a work accident, is 
aggressive and alcoholic. The second half of the film follows the first 
months of Duff and Josie’s marriage, as Duff leaves the transient work 
of the section gang and tries to find local work after being blacklisted 
for starting “trouble” at the mill (trying to form some kind of union 
On Baldwin, Film, and Acknowledgment  1007
amongst the Black workers). Duff briefly leaves Josie in a moment of 
agonized frustration and anger, which he misdirects at her, before 
finally returning from Birmingham with his young son from another 
relationship. The film ends with a close shot of Duff’s and Josie’s faces 
as they embrace, and Duff telling her, “it ain’t gonna be easy, but it’s 
gonna be alright. Baby, I feel so free inside.”
In what follows I demonstrate the specific ways the film works 
to picture racism as a pervasive, material, structural reality. It does so 
by emphasizing the material world of the characters, and by empha-
sizing the characters’ interiority. By emphasizing both the materiality 
of the world and the inwardness of the characters, Nothing But a Man 
pictures a genuinely human reality—a reality that is lived and that 
lives in its inhabitants—rather than a spectacle. I show how both the 
film’s and the main characters’ reticence are its way of acknowledg-
ing the separateness and non-transparency of what it shows, where 
this very reticence is also what implicates the viewer, calling for her 
more active engagement.
Early in the film, Duff and Josie are out on their first date. After 
going dancing, they drive to a quiet spot and talk about work: Josie 
observes that Duff must be “kinda cut off” since he can’t stay in one 
place very long. Duff says it keeps him out of “trouble,” a word that 
recurs throughout the script, typically referring to his racial resis-
tance. (Late in the film he even commits to it as a way of life: “I guess 
I’ll make some trouble in town.”) Their conversation in the car is shot 
in intimate close-up, their faces illuminated against a blacked-out 
background (figure 1); as Terri Francis writes of the scene, “the face is 
the landscape, the world writ small” (2015, 101).
Behind Josie’s head, there is a bullet hole in the car window, 
an unremarked-upon sign of Duff’s “troubles” (the world, again, writ 
small). After Duff kisses her and they have an extremely charming 
back and forth about how many times Josie’s been kissed (“not count-
ing tonight?” she jokes drily, “must be about 28 times”), a white hand 
reaches over the window in the upper left corner of the shot, right be-
hind her head, right beside the bullet hole. The otherwise static cam-
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Figure 1. Josie and Duff in Duff’s car
Figure 2. Josie and Duff being harassed
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era then pans up from Josie’s face to a young white man staring and 
grinning while an off-screen voice asks if they’re “doing anything” 
before joining his friend.
As Francis writes in her careful analysis, “the scene exempli-
fies the intensely personal registers of racial conflict. Duff and Josie’s 
relationship is exposed in ways that they can neither prevent nor 
regulate” (2015, 105). The white men disrupt Josie and Duff’s priva-
cy (figure 2), and their arrival is marked by a cinematographic shift: 
while previously Duff and Josie had commanded the camera’s obser-
vant, motionless attention, with the rest of the world obscured, here 
the camera’s movement away from Josie and up to the white figure 
activates that off-screen space to indicate the wider world surround-
ing the couple. With this small pivot, their privacy is revealed to be 
precarious and surveilled, and the off-screen space and wider world 
are revealed to be not neutral but specific: racialized and threatening.
In the next scene, as they drive through the dark town, Duff 
asks Josie why she stays. She stays so she can be a decent teacher in 
the segregated school. She says the town is better than it used to be: 
“eight years ago they still had a lynching here. Tied a man to a car 
and dragged him to death.” Josie and Duff’s plain conversation here 
invokes the most iconic image of American racial violence, her “still” 
functioning to bind her town’s recent history to an even longer past.
As with the bullet hole, explosive racial violence is not shown 
but referenced. The bullet hole and Josie’s memory function to situ-
ate the racial violence at one and the same time in the world and 
in the characters’ specific experiences, as lodged in their lives (even 
if indirectly5). The lynching is not directly shown, not presented as 
a legible, iconic, overdetermined spectacle. Rather, it is cited and 
voiced as a memory that one character shares with another. Whereas 
the meaning and significance of a horrific spectacle are assumed to be 
transparent, here Josie’s unemotional delivery and the brevity of her 
description generate a sense of privacy and opacity. The lynching is 
not transparently significant or for us; it is rather her memory, and she 
does not elaborate. At the same time, the casualness of their conver-
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sation communicates some kind of unspoken understanding. In this 
way, while the use of memory and citation presents racial violence 
as something that is lived and lived with, this memory is not wholly 
individualized but voiced as of a world and a past that they share.
On the use of scenes of visceral racial violence, Baldwin writes: 
“one need not, indeed, search for examples so historic or so gaudy; 
this is a warfare waged daily in the heart” (1955, 15). Nothing But a 
Man’s primary concern is this daily intimate warfare, and it pictures 
this by weaving racial violence into an ordinary night out and into 
the materiality of their ordinary world, as something the characters 
navigate, resist, and remember. The point here is not that in order 
to picture racism as a reality, a film must refrain from depicting any 
extreme or even iconic violence. The point is that such violence must 
be integrated and earned, and must resist the mode of moralizing or 
titillating spectacle.6
Nothing But a Man attends to the ways racism and racial violence 
show up within, shape, and threaten intimate spheres and relation-
ships,7 and also how they show up at work, the other major site of 
ordinary life. We have seen that the film’s opening, orienting scene is 
of Black men at work in the material world. There are several other 
scenes of work, and several scenes of coworkers together in close in-
terior spaces. The latter often involve composed shots of several faces 
and bodies, carefully organized to crowd out of the boxy cramped 
frame (a 1.33:1 aspect ratio). These scenes and shots present the soli-
tary and reserved Duff as nevertheless lodged within a specific and 
close community.
When Duff and Josie decide to get married, Duff must give up 
the transient but well-paying work of the section gang and get a job 
in town. He takes a job at the mill but leaves after word gets to his 
boss that he has proposed that the Black workers think about “get-
ting together.” He then finds it difficult to get decent work because 
his name has been put on an anti-union blacklist. The film shows 
Duff driving through the town’s public spaces, and through differ-
ent, specific places of possible employment. The repetition, mobility, 
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and physicality of these scenes effectively foreground what Tommy 
Curry calls the materiality of racism (2011, 129), situating racism in the 
world itself rather than in acute racist interactions.8 Foregrounding 
economic intimidation and threats to employment arguably presents 
a more historically accurate picture of the dominant form of midcen-
tury racism and racial violence, and yet my primary point here is to 
argue that as a narrative and visual strategy, the intertwinement of 
racism with the everydayness of work effectively pictures racism as 
materially real, as entrenched and pervasive, rather than as extraor-
dinary and individualized.9 What the film shows is not exceptional, 
but life.
Of course, an analysis of how Nothing But a Man pictures race 
would be incomplete without an analysis of how the film pictures 
its intersection with class (see Martin and Muhammad 2015; Smith 
2015). From the opening shot Duff is identified with manual labor, 
he is frequently placed in shots with other men on the section gang 
(either in cramped quarters or working outdoors), and he later makes 
explicit his commitment to unionized labor (this all in contrast to 
Josie, who we learn almost immediately has been to college). Clear-
ly, this emphatic identification of Duff with his work, which in turn 
identifies him with the materiality of the world, is central to the 
film’s presentation of the materiality of racism, though I am not able 
to explore this important aspect of the film here.10
I have tried to show some of the ways Nothing But a Man pictures 
racism as total structure. When trying to keep focus on racism as 
structure or a system, rather than a matter of individual psychology 
or morality, it might seem that we must turn attention away from the 
intimate and the personal and towards institutions, as though these 
were mutually exclusive objects of attention; thus it might seem that 
we would lose contact with the individual in his or her specificity. 
Baldwin himself sometimes suggests as much. In Devil, Baldwin criti-
cizes American films for reducing Black characters to their position 
within society and thereby denying them “privacy.” He notes that 
white characters (especially “white chicks”) are not defined by their 
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society but rather more by their personal lives and loves (“society is 
out of it, beneath her”). By contrast,
the private life of a black woman, to say nothing of the 
private life of a black man, cannot really be considered at 
all…. The situation of the black heroine, to say nothing of 
the black hero, must always be left at society’s mercy: in 
order to justify white history and in order to indicate the 
essential validity of the black condition. (1976, 117)
Baldwin is concerned about films that submerge a character in 
a social role, such that she or he is all role, in a way that functions to 
normalize the character’s oppressed condition and reduce her to it. 
This seems actually to be an acute risk for films that seek to present 
racism as systemic, world-constituting reality; the risk is that such a 
film might naturalize, picture as inevitable, what is in fact a histori-
cally specific, contingent, and changeable reality. But there is a differ-
ence between a work that reduces a character to their social position 
in a way that asserts the inevitability of the latter, and a work that 
presents a character as living in a definite, oppressive social world 
and as inhabiting a complex position in a definite and personal way. 
In the latter case, the presentation of a character’s engagement with 
the world is a way of maintaining both the link between the social 
and the personal without losing the latter, and the productive tension 
of a divided aesthetic attention.11
Nothing But a Man preserves Josie and Duff’s privacy, thanks 
both to the intimate cinematography and to the performances of Dix-
on and Lincoln. Abbey Lincoln performs Josie as forthright but not 
transparent. She often pauses before speaking or looks to the side, 
and she is amused when Duff reveals his preconceptions of her as 
“the preacher’s daughter.” But Nothing But a Man is Dixon’s film. Dix-
on’s performance is reserved and internal; he plays Duff as someone 
who holds himself way back and inside, and yet this guarded perfor-
mance radiates with learned caution, rage, fear, yearning, love, and 
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occasionally bemused skepticism. What I want to suggest is that this 
character’s manifest interiority is one of the film’s essential strategies 
of acknowledgment and for calling for acknowledgment and involve-
ment on the part of the viewer.
The film gives itself totally to Duff’s privacy in two tracking 
shots of Duff walking down a street at night, once in town and once 
in Birmingham. In both instances, the camera stays to his side and 
follows the pace he sets as the world fills the soundscape: car horns, 
sirens, bar music, church music, his own footsteps. Duff is wholly 
inward, completely preoccupied by his own thoughts, and yet by fore-
grounding the surrounding sounds, the film suggests that he is not 
withdrawing from the world but reflecting on it and on how to live in 
it. It suggests that his apparent withdrawal, narrativized through his 
transient work and initial trepidation about marriage, is his specific 
strategy for living in it; the question of whether he can finally survive 
through this strategy is the question of the film. The tracking shots 
affirm Duff’s inwardness and separateness, and let us see that he is 
thinking but not what he is thinking. Attending to his thoughtfulness 
while maintaining the camera’s distance, hence without disclosure or 
resolution, is one way the film allows its very form to be implicated in 
what it shows, as though the camera’s watchful movement and were 
called for by Duff’s carefully protected inwardness.
By picturing the characters in postures of active reflection 
and inwardness within a specific racist environment, Nothing But a 
Man pictures a structural, institutional, material reality—a human 
world—but it pictures this reality as cognized, felt, and resisted—that 
is, as lived. Whereas a spectacle is wholly for its observer, all exter-
nality and obvious in its intended significance, a film that aims to 
picture a genuine human reality must do so in a way that maintains 
its interiority and opacity: we are present to it but it is not wholly for 
us.12 Recall that for Baldwin, a gaudy spectacle dictates a ready un-
derstanding of and moral response to the events shown and thereby 
fails to genuinely involve the viewer. By contrast, Nothing But a Man’s 
formal and narrative reticence and the reservation and opacity of the 
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characters are how it manages to function as a kind of acknowledg-
ment. This reticence means that the film does not do all the work but 
rather calls on the viewer for a more thoughtful mode of imaginative 
engagement, implicating the viewer in what she’s watching.
These are some of the ways Nothing But a Man constitutes an ac-
knowledgment of American racism as a lived reality rather than just a 
more historically accurate presentation of it (more “knowledge”). The 
film does not simply present and the audience does not merely learn 
some new set of facts. Rather, as I have been emphasizing, what is 
pictured, what the audience experiences, is a material and human re-
ality, at once structural and personal. The film’s narrative and formal 
specificities constitute its concrete strategies of acknowledgment.13
reflecting on the responsibility of the united states to acknowledge 
its past, two absences are striking: as of 2020, there is no national 
memorial to those it enslaved or to those oppressed by Jim Crow laws 
and practices, and the federal government has never offered a formal 
apology for these state-sponsored, nation-building institutions.14 One 
explanation for this absence is that there is still insufficient public 
acknowledgment of these wrongs as institutions and practices—
forms of life—that define America’s history and present.15 An apol-
ogy offered in the absence of such acknowledgment would either not 
receive the requisite public support (a 2019 poll shows only 35 percent 
of whites support a governmental apology), or would read as precisely 
a one-off special event, that is, as a dis-integrated and empty spectacle. 
As Roy L. Brooks argues, something must “transform the rhetoric of 
apology into a meaningful, material reality” (2019, 155).
One way to do this, Brooks proposes, is through reparations, 
which “solidify” public apology and “make apologies believable” 
(142). Additionally, an apology can—I would argue, must—be real-
ized, made real, only when integrated into a larger set of social, cul-
tural, and material practices of acknowledgment. As just one part of 
such a larger set, an official apology might lose its veneer of singu-
lar, quasi-magical importance, but as grounded in such practices, it 
would thereby gain in genuine reality.
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In this context, film can function to further clarify the nature 
of the wrong and make vivid what it is that the apology is for. Films 
can also acknowledge the extremely subtle, lived dimensions of the 
wrong that could not possibly be addressed by an official apology. 
Or, by picturing the reality of American racism as America’s reality, 
where racism is one of the principal facts of American life, a film 
might also reveal the profound difficulty of offering an apology for 
American racism. What would it mean to apologize for a reality?
I finished drafting this essay in June 2020, as Black Lives Matter 
demonstrations erupted in response to the police murders of George 
Floyd in Minneapolis and Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky—
protests against police violence met with police violence in response. 
Accompanying the protests was a daily public discourse on racism 
in policing and the possibility of police abolition. At the same time, 
voices warned against the temptation to focus critical attention exclu-
sively on police violence. In an essay for the New Yorker called “How 
Do We Change America?” Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (2020) writes of 
“the importance of expanding our national discussion about what ails 
the country beyond the racism and brutality of the police.” Other-
wise, she continues, “we risk reducing racism to the outrageous and 
intentional acts of depraved individuals.” 
This specific reduction, this absorption by the outrageous, con-
stitutes a formal, political, ethical, and aesthetic strategy of atten-
tion, providing an entrenched, collective way of picturing the world. 
Taylor’s point, of course, is not that we should not focus on police 
brutality but that we must be cautious about the ways in which such 
violence can capture our attention and constrain our political imagi-
nation. Film, I’ve argued, is a medium that can either re-deploy this 
reductive strategy or engage its capacities to resist the temptation.  I 
have tried to analyze some of the ways in which outrageous spectacle 
functions in film, and I have indicated some of film’s possibilities 
for resisting that temptation in the service of a more expansive and 
therefore more adequate acknowledgment of reality.
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NOTES
1. Given his emphasis on racism’s power to shape our basic sense of 
self and world, and his concern to de-emphasize individuals’ beliefs 
and feelings, it is fruitful to read Baldwin in relation to contemporary 
philosophers arguing for an ideological conception of racism. See 
especially Gooding-Williams (forthcoming), Haslanger (2017), Mills 
(2017).
2. This is an empirical claim, and so I leave it to the reader to consult 
American films “about” racism to see whether they execute this strat-
egy, either in whole or in part.  In 2020, at the height of the Black 
Lives Matter uprising and at the time of writing this essay, director 
Kasi Lemmons wrote a piece for the Washington Post titled “White 
Americans, your lack of imagination is killing us,” making a simi-
lar observation.  She writes: “You’re addicted to the pornography of 
our pain. When I made my first movie, “Eve’s Bayou,” I got questions 
about why I didn’t include incidents of white racism in a movie about 
a Creole family … Twenty-two years later, some critics said that the 
racist violence in “Harriet,” my film about Harriet Tubman, wasn’t 
vicious enough. Apparently, they couldn’t understand that I wanted 
to tell a story about a black woman’s triumph, rather than make a 
movie that reveled in pain and degradation. I wondered why they 
craved seeing black bodies get beaten. If you see us only when we’re 
… victims who satisfy your taste for violence or death, then you don’t 
see us as fully human” (2020).
3. The one book dedicated to this film is the indispensable The Politics and 
Poetics of Black Film: Nothing But a Man (Martin and Muhammad 2015), 
an edited collection that provides scholarship, primary resources 
(including the screenplay and press kit), and statements by the film-
On Baldwin, Film, and Acknowledgment  1017
makers. This was my resource for most of the empirical details I cite 
regarding production and distribution.
4. Roemer would later claim that he would not make the film now, as a 
white director. “In those days we had the gumption to think we could 
identify with blacks” (quoted in Smith 2015). I cannot here address 
the difficult questions concerning the relationship between the racial 
and social position of artists and the racial and social content of the 
work they create. It is important to note that the preproduction and 
production of Nothing But a Man was extremely collaborative, which is 
not to say it was without conflict (see Martin and Wall 2015).
5. Richard Wright describes this indirectness: “the things that influ-
enced my conduct as a Negro did not have to happen to me directly; 
I needed but to hear of them to feel their full effects in the deepest 
layers of my consciousness. Indeed the white brutality that I had not 
seen was a more effective control of my behavior than that which 
I knew. The actual experience would have let me see the realistic 
outlines of what was really happening, but as long as it remained 
something terrible and yet remote, something whose horror and 
blood might descend upon me at any moment, I was compelled to 
give my entire imagination over to it” (Wright [1937] 1945, 150–51, 
quoted in Wood 2018, 759).
6. To consider two popular examples: the police murder of Radio 
Raheem (Bill Nunn) at the end of Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing (1989) 
is an example of explosive, iconic violence that is integrated and 
earned, hence pictured as part of reality rather than as marginal (see 
also Mitchell 1990 on the film’s deployment of violence). I would 
argue that 12 Years a Slave (2013) is a mixed case, and that the extended 
scene of Topsy (Lupita Nyong-o) being whipped resorts to racism-as-
spectacle. Thanks to Rafeeq Hasan for raising this question.
7. In this paper I cannot even begin to discuss the significance of Duff’s 
relationships with his own father and Josie’s father.
8. As the hosts of the podcast The Micheaux Mission, Vincent Williams 
and Len Webb note: “if there had been an inciting incident, then 
that person would be the focus of his and our anger. But without it, 
the violence becomes genuinely structural” (2017).
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9. In their dialogue about the film, Michael T. Martin and David Wall 
(2015) critique it on various points: for instance, for its potentially 
conservative gender and family politics, for its depiction of the Black 
church as depoliticized, and for the absence of any overt activism 
or mention of the Civil Rights Movement. My aim is not to deny or 
contest any of this, or to assert that the film is wholly politically 
adequate. My central focus is on how the film tells the kind of story it 
does, and how it pictures American racism.
10. It would be fruitful to analyze filmic and narrative strategies for 
emphasizing the materiality of racism in different class contexts. One 
example would be Douglas Sirk’s melodrama Imitation of Life (1959), 
which pictures and inhabits the perspective and self-conception of 
white femininity as a kind of dazzling theater of exalted and self-
absorbed self-deception. Of course the character of Annie works as 
a housekeeper, and is thus identified with a working class position. 
But my thought is that one of the film’s central concerns is the way 
Lora’s increasingly extravagant form of life locks her into a kind of 
racialized blindness, and that the film depicts this in part through 
the excesses of the material world she builds around her.
11. On the difficulty of achieving and maintaining this attention, Cavell 
writes: “in a world in which it is common to rest assured that a given 
problem is either neurotic or existential, psychological or political, 
few works are sufficiently autonomous to testify that the relation 
between self and community (because they are composed of one 
another) is an undying dialectic” (1971, 138).
12. This idea that film acknowledges our separateness from the world 
that it shows is a major thesis of Cavell’s work on the ontology of film 
and photography: “photography maintains the presentness of the 
world by accepting our absence from it. The reality of a photograph is 
present to me while I am not present to it” (1971, 23, and passim).
13. A fuller exploration of this idea that film can acknowledge racism as 
a structural reality would involve demonstrating how this task can 
be realized in different genres and kinds of films. It is not at all the 
case that reality can only be acknowledged via a realist aesthetic. As 
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mentioned earlier (note 10), Douglas Sirk’s Imitation of Life (1959) pres-
ents the perspective of white femininity as self-absorbed self-decep-
tion. Donald Glover’s television series Atlanta (2016–present) engages 
uncanny and surreal aesthetic strategies to explore the bizarre, 
self-contradictory, fantastical, and alienating qualities of American 
racism.
14. The Equal Justice Initiative has been working for the past several 
years on memorials to lynching victims and has recently opened 
The Legacy Museum: From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration, 
which was funded by private donations and charitable foundations. 
Starting in 2007 with Virginia, several states have apologized for slav-
ery and Jim Crow, and resolutions have passed in both the House of 
Representatives (2008) and the Senate (2009); these typically include 
disclaimers in order to avoid commitment to or responsibility for 
reparations.
15. Another explanation is that a formal apology would invite demands 
for reparations, demands the American government is unwilling to 
seriously address.
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